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Recent publications reveal that high frequency trading (HFT) is responsible for
10 to 70 per cent of the order volume in
stock and derivatives trading (Gomber et
al. 2011; Hendershott and Riordan 2011;
Zhang 2010). This observation leads to
a controversial debate over positive and
negative implications of HFT for the liquidity and efficiency of electronic securities markets and over the costs and
benefits of and needs for market regulation. Currently the European Union
(EU) is considering the introduction of
a financial transaction tax to curtail the
harmful effects of HFT strategies. The
consideration behind this market policy is based on the assumption that the
very short-term oriented HFT trading
strategies lead to market frictions. This
current discourse shows that the arguing parties do not homogeneously define HFT. Reasons for this are the proponents’ different but intertwined perspectives, which lead to new unanswered
questions in numerous subjects of expertise. From a macroeconomic point of
view the question arises if HFT constrains
or supports the allocation function of financial markets. Capital market research
and information management research
raise questions about the future form
of intermediation in securities trading
and the coming architecture of markets,
about the HFT’s impact on liquidity and
about price volatility. Financial authorities and regulators discuss whether HFT
has a stabilizing or destabilizing function
on financial systems and how a future
regulation should be shaped.
This collection of articles shall help to
develop a common definition of HFT
and contribute to the ongoing discussions. To that end we have collected articles from representatives of information systems, business management, the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Deutsche
Boerse AG. The following scientists and
practitioners participated in the discussion (in alphabetical order):
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Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Burghof and Arne
Breuer, Chair of Business Economics,
especially Banking and Financial Services, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
 Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber, Chair of Business Economics, especially e-Finance,
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University
of Frankfurt, Germany.
 Dr. Joachim Nagel, Member of the
Board of Directors, and Dr. Rafael Zajonz, Central Market Analysis, Portfolio, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt,
Germany.
 Rainer Riess, Managing Director of the
Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (FWB),
and Michael Krogmann, Executive
Vice President of Xetra Market Development of Deutsche Börse AG, Frankfurt, Germany.
 Prof. Dr. Ryan Riordan, Institute for
Information Systems and Management, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany.
HFT is a part of algorithmic trading. Gomolka (2011) defines algorithmic trading as the processing and/or execution of trading strategies by the means
of intelligent electronic solution routines (known as algorithms). Thus algorithmic trading encompasses computersupported trading as well as computergenerated sell-side and buy-side market
transactions. Algorithmic trading strategies can be both short-term and longterm oriented.
In general, HFT is defined as real-time
computer-generated decision making in
financial trading, without human interference and based on automatized order
generation and order management. HFT
encompasses short-term trading strategies, which – in extreme cases – operate
in the range of microseconds using minimal price differences. HFT thus results in
minimal profit margins per transactions
and exhibits very short holding periods of
securities positions.
However, HFT definitions vary and
various properties of HFT are not
consistently discussed in the literature.
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Aldridge’s (2009) definition of HFT holding periods range from milliseconds to
one day. Durbin (2010) on the other
hand describes HFT as trading strategies, which covers seconds or milliseconds only. According to Brogaard (2010),
HFT is extremely short-term buying or
selling with the intention to profit from
minimal price fluctuations.
Further characteristics are often mentioned but are not always included in
HFT definitions, such as the exclusive usage by professional/institutional investors
in proprietary trading, real-time data
processing and direct market access (Dacorogna et al. 2001). Another controversial issue is the avoidance of overnight
risk (Aldridge 2009). Other definitions
underline the role of HFT as financial
intermediary (Hendershott and Riordan
2011) or try to find differences among
the implemented trading strategies (Ye
2011).
On the basis of the broad HFT definition given before the authors in this article will shed light on the following questions: (1) How does HFT influence the
liquidity and efficiency of electronic securities markets? (2) What are the costs and
benefits of, and what are the needs for a
HFT regulation?
Peter Gomber analyzes HFT from a
market microstructure perspective, and
finds HFT to be a central element of the
value creation chain in securities trading. As part of the value creation chain,
HFT contributes to increased efficiency
and reduced explicit and implicit transaction costs. In his eyes, regulation of HFT
could lead to dramatic changes in market
behavior, while an inappropriate regulation might even be counterproductive for
market quality. Gomber sees the problems for profound research on HFT in the
lack of data available for empirical studies. Again this leads to adverse effects in
discussions of the topic in the public, in
the media, and with regulators.
Ryan Riordan also looks at HFT from
the perspective of market microstructure
and interprets HFT as one form of technological financial intermediation which
contributes to the efficiency of operations in exchange trading. In his eyes,
HFT plays an important role in the process of price formation and influences the
size of transaction costs in securities trading. According to him, one cannot yet
say whether HFT will have a positive or
a negative impact on the capital markets.
However, he sees major advantages in a
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highly technologized market. It is no alternative for him to turn back the wheels
and return to a backward oriented, artificially slowed, regulated trading, which is
based on human intermediation.
Rainer Riess and Michael Krogmann
describe HFT as the highest evolutionary level of securities trading. In their
opinion HFT leads to faster processing
of information, to an increase in liquidity, and thus added values for the
overall economy. The authors describe
how HFT is currently technically realized and integrated into trading operations at the exchange, and deduct their
arguments accordingly. From the point of
view of Deutsche Börse, HFT is mainly
used by institutional investors in proprietary trading and focuses on highly
liquid stocks. The authors correlate the
rise of HFT with a continuous improvement of the electronic trading system XETRA, which – from the point of view
of Deutsche Börse – benefits all market
participants in the same way. In the eyes
of Riess and Krogmann, a future regulation of HFT should primarily focus on
equal chances of competition in the EUarea, in order to create “a level playing
field“. From the point of view of Deutsche
Börse, it is necessary not only to implement security mechanisms on the side of
exchanges but also with HFT-firms.
Arne Breuer and Hans-Peter Burghof
also recognize that, due to HFT, information can be processed more perfectly
and faster than ever before. They look at
the topic from the perspective of financial economics. This point of view leads
them to believe that more and faster information does not necessarily lead to
a correct determination of the intrinsic value of financial instruments. Rather
HFT processes short-term information,
which primarily is made of short-term
volume and short-term time series data,
and thus does not contribute to the evaluation of the intrinsic values. The authors vote for a stricter regulation of HFT.
However, before this can be done, more
analyses should be conducted. For this,
more data are necessary.
Finally, Joachim Nagel und Rafael Zajonz argue from the perspective of regulators. A blanket judgment on HFT is
from the regulators’ point of view neither adequate nor would it lead to improvements of the regulatory framework
regarding transparency, stability, and efficiency. The impact of HFT on the efficiency of securities trading is – due to the
absence of a scientific discussion – still

unclear for the regulators. The possibility
to destabilize the market due to HFT in
volatile market situations is regarded as
critical but should be looked into in detail. From the point of view of the authors
“market friendly” strategies exist, a fact
which can be judged positively. But there
are also ”unfriendly strategies“, which –
from their perspective – can be categorized as potentially harmful. In the center of their article, the authors formulate the wish that this complex topic may
be discussed more intensely by the scientific community in the future, in order
to better understand which fundamental,
regulatory measures should be applied to
HFT.
If you would like to comment
on this topic or another article of
the journal Business & Information
Systems Engineering, please send
your contribution (max. 2 pages) to
the editor-in-chief, Prof. Hans Ulrich Buhl, University of Augsburg,
Hans-Ulrich.Buhl@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de.
Prof. Dr. Christoph Lattemann
School of Humanities and Social
Sciences
Jacobs University Bremen
Prof. Dr. Peter Loos
IWi at DFKI
Saarland University
Dr. Johannes Gomolka
Tempelhove Research

2 High Frequency Trading
Regulation Required at a
Reasonable Level
It is uncommon for a specific subject
in the field of securities trading and ITinnovation to draw as much public attention as high frequency trading (HFT) has
been doing in recent months. Merely a
special field for a small group of experts
prior to 2010, it is now a frequent part
of the general news coverage. Against the
background of the recent debt crisis, the
current volatility and market turmoil as
well as the “US Flash Crash” on May 6,
2010 lead to this extreme attention. Several parties attempt to exert pressure on
politics and regulation by making HFT
responsible for that crisis and the high
market volatility. In reaction to the aforementioned incidents and to the subsequent public discussions, the regulatory
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authorities of international financial centers have debated the adoption of various regulatory measures and now propose regulatory procedures, which currently substantiate especially in Europe
and will presumably be approved in 2012
in the context of the revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID).
Basically, the trading strategies based
on HFT can be subdivided into active and passive ones. Whereas passive
strategies provide other market participants with trading opportunities in terms
of quotes and limit orders (e.g. electronic market making), active strategies primarily attempt to exploit imbalances of asset prices in fragmented markets (e.g. primary market and multilateral trading facilities), discrepancies in
valuation between different asset classes
(e.g. between derivatives and their underlyings) or deviances of current asset valuations compared to historical
correlations (e.g. in the so-called pairs
trading) immediately after the emergence of these trading/arbitrage opportunities.
The emerging academic literature,
which analyzes the effects of HFT based
strategies on market quality, shows
mostly positive impact (for a systematic outline of academic research concerning HFT see Gomber et al. 2011).
Regarding price discovery, liquidity and
volatility, most studies discover positive
effects of HFT. Only a few publications
indicate that HFT can increase the adverse selection problem under specific
circumstances, and in the case of the “US
Flash Crash” another survey (Kirilenko
et al. 2011) reveals that HFT can increase
volatility.
The growing market efficiency and a
reduction of explicit and implicit transaction costs triggered by HFT is an obvious issue particularly for those market participants who used to capitalize on
intermediary services and broad bid/ask
spreads in a formerly less efficient and
less liquid trading environment. In contrast to off-exchange trading via internalization and so-called dark pools, i.e.
non-transparent execution venues, HFT
market-making strategies on lit markets
face relevant adverse selection costs as
they provide liquidity on the market
without knowing their counterparties.
Within their internalization systems and
dark pools in the OTC field, banks and
brokers are aware of their counterparties’
Business & Information Systems Engineering

identities and can benefit from this information. Contrary to this, HFTs in lit markets are not aware of the toxicity of their
counterparts and are – analogous to market makers – exposed to the problem of
adverse selection.
Inappropriate regulation of HFT based
strategies or an impact on HFT business
models due to excessive burdens might
turn out to be counterproductive and
lead to unforeseeable consequences for
the quality of markets. However, abusive
strategies have to be combated effectively
by the regulators. Particularly the analysis of the “US Flash Crash” with its discussed solution approaches can hardly
be transferred to the European situation,
since the issues related to the “US Flash
Crash” primarily result from the US market structure. In Europe, where a more
flexible best execution regime is implemented and a share-by-share volatility
safeguard regime has been in place for
two decades, no market quality problems
related to HFT have been documented so
far. Therefore, a European approach to
the subject matter is required, and Europe should be cautious about addressing and fixing a problem that exists in a
different market structure and thus creating risks for market efficiency and market
quality.
Any regulatory interventions in Europe
should try to preserve the benefits of HFT
while mitigating the risks as far as possible by assuring that (i) HFT firms are
able to provide documentation on their
algorithms upon authorities’ request and
to conduct back-testing, (ii) markets are
capable of handling peaks in trading activity and apply safeguards to react to
technical issues of their members’ algorithms, (iii) a diversity of trading strategies prevails to prevent systemic risks,
(iv) co-location and proximity services
are implemented on a level playing field,
(v) regulators have a complete overview
of the possible systemic risks which could
be triggered by HFT, and have employees who have the knowledge and the tools
to assess the impact of the trading algorithms on market quality and the associated risks. Furthermore, it is crucial
that market places in a fragmented environment develop coordinated safeguards
und circuit breakers, which mirror the
HFT reality and enable all market participants to react adequately even in market
stress.
Regulatory proposals demanding continuous liquidity provision by HFT in the
sense of market marking obligations or
2|2012

minimum quote lifetimes miss the mark
and are not suitable to improve market
stability or market integrity. They rather
contribute to a decrease in market quality
and higher transaction costs.
At first sight, demanding obligations
for HFTs to provide quotes seems an appropriate measure to tackle the problem
of a sudden liquidity withdrawal. However, it is highly doubtful whether any
rule can force market makers to buy in
the face of overwhelming selling pressure. In such a situation they might rather
take the risk of being fined for not fulfilling their obligations. Many HFT strategies are characterized by rapid closing
of built-up positions to minimize risk.
Hence, an obligation to provide liquidity
and thereby risk capital is in sharp contrast to many HFT business models. Due
to the significant regulatory costs those
obligations would potentially lead to a
retreat from the market and thus to a
notable loss of liquidity.
Also a minimum order lifetime, which
at first glance appears to be useful to
avoid fast order submissions and immediate cancellations, would lead to a
significant change in market behavior.
Market participants are then no longer
able to react quickly and adequately to
market-exogenous information (e.g. adhoc news) and the necessity to keep an
order in the order book presents a free
option for other market participants. Besides, the existence of minimum order
lifetimes would lead to an implementation of trading strategies capitalizing on
the “lock in” of orders. HFT would anticipate the accompanied risks and costs
and attempt to compensate these costs
with higher spreads, which again would
have negative effects on market quality.
In this debate it should not be neglected
that speed is the key tool for HFTs’ risk
management.
HFT is an important factor in markets that are driven by sophisticated technology on all layers of the trading value
chain. However, discussions on this topic
often lack sufficient and precise information. A remarkable gap between the results of academic research on HFT and
its perceived impact on markets in public,
media and regulatory discussions (European Commission 2010) can be observed.
Here, the provision of granular and reliable data by the industry can assist empirical research at the interface of finance
and IS to provide important contributions to a reasonable regulation of HFT.
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This regulation should eventually minimize the inherent risks of the technology in question without hindering the
indisputably existing positive effects for
market quality.
Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber
University of Frankfurt
E-Finance Lab

3 High Frequency Trading (HFT) –
A New Intermediary
Financial markets require intermediaries
to provide liquidity and immediacy for
other participants. These intermediaries,
often called market makers or specialists, were often afforded special status
and located on the trading floor, or close
to the trading mechanism of exchanges.
The automation of financial markets has
increased their trading capacity and intermediaries have expanded their use of
technology. This has resulted in a reduced
role for traditional human market makers and led to the rise of a new intermediary, referred to as high frequency traders
(HFTs).
This development has been made possible by the technological innovations in
recent years. HFT strategies usually make
use of the high speed technologies to
build up and unwind positions within
milli- and microseconds. Prerequisites
for this development were the reduction of system latency and the increase
of computing power and data processing capabilities of computers. Next to the
large investments in HFT, exchanges have
also invested large amounts of money in
their IT infrastructure. For example, the
costs of a high-speed connection between
Chicago and New York are estimated
around $200,000 per mile (Forbes 2010).
The question remains whether these investments are justified with regard to the
increase of overall market quality and
welfare that results from higher HFT
activity on the market.
Like traditional intermediaries HFTs
hold little inventory, have short holding periods, and trade often. Unlike traditional intermediaries, however, HFTs
are not granted preferential access to the
market not available to others and they
employ advanced and innovative technology to intermediate trading. Without such privileges, there is no clear basis for imposing the traditional obligations of market makers on HFT. The substantial, largely negative media coverage
96

of HFT and the so called “flash crash”
on May 6, 2010 raise significant interest
and concerns about the role HFT play in
the stability and price efficiency of financial markets. The predominantly negative
coverage seems mostly unfounded.
Overall, HFTs’ impact is similar to
that of other intermediaries and speculators. Speculators can improve price efficiency by obtaining more information
on prices and by trading against pricing errors. Manipulative strategies and
predatory trading could decrease price
efficiency. Reducing pricing errors improves the efficiency of prices. HFTs’ informational advantage, which is driven
by the technology they employ, is shortterm. It is unclear whether or not this
short-term information and intraday reductions of pricing errors facilitate better
financial decisions and resource allocations by firms and investors. If the shortterm information – that HFTs price in –
would not otherwise become public microseconds later, HFT clearly plays an important role (Hendershott and Riordan
2011). It would be an important positive
role of smaller pricing errors if these corresponded to lower implicit transaction
costs by long-term investors.
One important point left unaddressed
thus far is whether or not HFTs engage in
manipulative or predatory trading. Their
use of technology may allow HFTs to manipulate prices at speeds that are undetectable by slower traders. A manipulative strategy might be the ignition of a
price movement in one direction only in
order to trade on the opposite side of the
market as proposed by the SEC (2010)
and therefore cause significant pricing
errors. As is frequently done, one can
argue whether the underlying problem
of possible manipulation lies with the
manipulator or the market participant
who is manipulated. In the SEC example, the passive manipulation could not
succeed if there were no price matching.
The manipulation stories could be tested
with more detailed data identifying each
market participant’s orders, trading, and
positions in all markets.
Despite the strong evidence of the positive role of HFT for the efficiency of
price determination and trading costs
(Hendershott et al. 2011; Brogaard 2010;
Zhang and Riordan 2011), regulators and
the media are certain that they must be
regulated. It is, however, unclear and also
debatable how we should regulate HFT.
Assuming that some, or most, of their

activities contribute positively to liquidity and price efficiency, which parts of
their trading should we regulate? There
are controversially discussed suggestions
to restrict HFTs’ mostly passive trading or
to enforce a minimum order life on limit
orders. Restricting HFTs’ ability to trade
actively necessarily impedes their ability
to manage the risks associated with intermediation. This may lead to less intermediation and lower liquidity. Imposing minimum order lives on limit orders may also negatively impact HFTs’
ability to manage trading risks during
volatile market periods that existed before HFT dominated the equity market.
Finally, the discussions of US and European regulation should take into account
specific differences of both markets. Despite the high market fragmentation, the
European market has maintained a comparably high degree of efficiency. This is
also due to the help of HFTs. They make
use of arbitrage strategies to dissolve existing price deviations within seconds
which results in an interconnectedness of
European markets.
A final point is a more general one
on technology investments. HFTs must
make a large and long-term investment in
technology, both hardware and software.
This investment in technology seems to
have to paid-off both for HFTs and the
equity markets. If regulation were to
negatively impact the returns on investments in HFT technologies by reducing
the profitability of intermediation, fewer
firms will be willing to invest in these
technologies. This may lead to a situation in which one or two highly specialized firms dominate intermediation,
which ultimately leads to less competition, lower liquidity and reduced priceefficiency. Competition, ease of market
entry and the use of specialized and innovative technology seem to be the best
guarantors of market stability.
It is hard to imagine a situation in
which HFTs are able to artificially manipulate prices for longer periods of
time given the intense competition other
HFTs. HFTs are one type of intermediary.
When thinking about the role HFT plays
in markets it is natural to try to compare
the new market structure to the previous market structure. Some primary differences are that there is free entry into
HFT, HFTs do not have a designated role
with special privileges, and HFTs do not
have special obligations. When considering the optimal industrial organization of
the intermediation sector, which includes
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regulation, market structure, technology
and incumbency, HFT more closely resembles a highly competitive environment than traditional market structures.
A central question is whether there were
benefits of the more highly regulated and
less technology intensive intermediation
sector which outweigh the costs of lower
innovation and higher entry costs typically associated with regulation. The answer to this question seems thus far to be
a resounding “no”.
Prof. Dr. Ryan Riordan
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM 2010) considers HFT
as a legitimate trading method which is
not market abusive under normal circumstances. According to Gomber, academic papers mostly could not find evidence for negative effects of HFT on
market quality. Moreover, the Germanybased Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
(KIT) concluded their study based on
analysis of NASDAQ data with the finding that HFT even worked as a buffer
against plunging stock prices during the
crisis years 2008 and 2009 (Zhang and
Riordan 2011).
4.2 Insights of an Exchange Operator

4 High Frequency Trading – An
Exchange Operator’s Perspective
4.1 High Frequency Trading – Myth and
Reality
On 2010-09-30, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (2010) issued a joint report
showing that the so-called “flash crash”,
a sequence of events which made prices
plunge throughout the US stock market, was caused by an incorrectly programmed trading algorithm of a traditional investment company which did
not use high frequency trading (HFT).
Nevertheless, HFT has gained massive
public attention ever since. The news media, as well scientists and regulatory authorities, are busy discussing and analyzing the effect of HFT on the global capital markets. While the public perception
of HFT is largely critical – and driven by
headlines demanding a HFT ban or, at
least, strict regulation – scientific analysis
comes to rather different conclusions (see
Gomber’s discussion above). According
to Brogaard’s (2010) study of HFT, blaming HFT for the US flash crash is not
the only popular fallacy regarding the
role of HFT in securities trading. Brogaard’s analysis of NASDAQ data showed
that for 65% of the time HFT accounted
for the best bid and ask quotes. Also,
Broogard found no evidence suggesting
that HFT firms systematically engage in
market abuse, e.g. by illegally taking advantage of information about client orders, the so-called “front running”. Since
HFT firms are proprietary traders, they
do not have any clients. Generally, scientific analysis did not find a correlation between HFT and market abuse.
Business & Information Systems Engineering

We live in a technology-driven society,
continuously striving to further improve
and advance the achievement potential
of our economy as well as of nearly
every aspect in our everyday life: can
anyone imagine a commercial flight today without the aid of an autopilot, or
modern microsurgery without robotics?
These advancements are by no means
ends in themselves but serve a greater
good. Just the same goes for the ever
increasing speed in securities trading –
a development which leads to continuously improving general market quality
and also to more efficient risk management for every market participant. The
faster the market data transmission, the
faster investors are able to adapt to ongoing market developments. This does not
only have a very positive effect on the
safety in securities trading but also on
transaction cost: faster trading leads to
tighter spreads and, therefore, to higher
liquidity. The implicit transaction costs
of every securities trade are determined
mainly by liquidity and account for up
to 80 percent of the overall transaction
costs, while the explicit transaction costs
– commissions, fees, taxes – are of minor
significance. With this in mind, Deutsche
Börse started long before the advent of
HFT to improve the trading infrastructure of its electronic trading platform Xetra, especially in view of ever decreasing systemic latency. At the same time,
Deutsche Börse further developed the security mechanisms and technologies respectively adapted them to the increasing demands of a more and more sophisticated and faster trading system, one of
them being the very effective instrument
of the volatility interruption, introduced
in 1999. This security mechanism is used
in extremely volatile market phases and
2|2012

leads to higher price stability: whenever
an indicative price is outside the price
range – which is pre-defined for every security traded on Xetra – a volatility interruption will be initiated around the
reference price.
While continuously advancing the
technical infrastructure, Deutsche Börse
expanded its offer of individually selectable bandwidths for market participants connected to Xetra from
512 Kbit/sec up to 2 Mbit/sec for their
Values API interfaces. In 2008, for Xetra members requiring even faster market data transmission and more order
book depth, an additional interface with
a bandwidth of 1 Gbit/sec was implemented, called Enhanced Broadcast Solution respectively Enhanced Transaction
Solution. Today, bandwidths of up to 10
GBit/sec are available. With the introduction of the so-called “non-persistent”
orders in 2009, Deutsche Börse further
enabled Xetra members to optimize their
response times to price changes thanks
to even faster data processing. “Nonpersistent” orders are not saved in exchange systems and are thus designed not
be executed after volatility interruptions.
In late 2011 Deutsche Börse complemented its connectivity portfolio with
the FIX (Financial Information Exchange) gateway. Market participants using this protocol now are able to connect
to Xetra far more easily.
However, there was one latency factor
left that even the most sophisticated technology could not overcome: the propagation delay due to physical distance. For
every 100 km which a market participant’s trading engine and the trading system of Xetra are physically apart, transaction latency increases by 1 msec approximately. This could mean a true competitive disadvantage for market participants
relying on ultra low latency. Deutsche
Börse addressed this growing market demand by introducing its proximity services in 2006. By placing the trading engine of distant Xetra members not only
virtually but physically close to the exchange back end – a process called colocation – the travel time of the market data could be drastically reduced. Today, 141 Xetra members take advantage
of Deutsche Börse’s co-location offer.
Thanks to a continuously perfected
trading infrastructure and the introduction of proximity services, Deutsche
Börse has not only remained competitive
on an international level but has also prepared Xetra optimally for the needs of
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HFT firms. Over the last few years, systemic latency on Xetra has been further
reduced notwithstanding a dramatic increase of technical transactions – an advantage to all market participants alike:
a fair, equal access to Xetra and the preand post-trade transparency characteristic of a regulated exchange make sure
that every investor enjoys all advantages
Deutsche Börse’s trading platform has to
offer.
While being a minority, HFT firms
nevertheless play an important role in
improving the order book quality on Xetra, e.g. by bundling the very heterogenic order flow. There are three organized forms of HFT on Xetra: the proprietary trading of investment firms, hedge
funds, and proprietary trading companies. Two types of trading prevail: first of
all, the so-called electronic liquidity provision. In this case, HFT firms act as voluntary market makers, adding liquidity
to a multitude of securities. The second
type of HFT on Xetra is called statistical
arbitrage which leads to improved price
discovery. Both types of HFT account
for tighter spreads and, ultimately, improved market efficiency on Xetra. So far,
Deutsche Börse could find no evidence of
HFT having lead to destabilizing markets
during periods of market turmoil, e.g. by
strengthening trends. During the highly
volatile market phase in August 2011, the
trading volume on Xetra increased temporarily to 107 million transactions on
one single day. Despite up to 30 volatility interruptions, the average transaction
processing took only 0.4 msec longer
than usual. System availability was guaranteed at all times, Xetra members did
not have to face any restrictions, let alone
system failure. Deutsche Börse’s market
security mechanisms made sure that all
trading activities could be executed properly and continuously while price stability was guaranteed even during market
turmoil.
Thus, Deutsche Börse succeeded in advancing the Xetra infrastructure in terms
of continuously decreasing systemic latency and, at the same time, met the
permanently increasing needs regarding
safety and speed of its trading system
even before the term HFT came up.
4.3 Regulatory Recommendations
Within a national economy it is the explicit function of a securities exchange to
facilitate the most efficient employment
98

of capital, ensuring best possible corporate financing and re-financing. HFT, as
it is today, supports faster processing of
economically relevant data and leads to
higher liquidity in the trading of company shares. Thanks to a stable, highperformance trading system, Deutsche
Börse was able to integrate HFT successfully and to use the positive effects of
HFT to improve overall market quality.
This would not have been possible without Deutsche Börse’s principle of equal
access and a fair set of rules applying to
every market participant trading on Xetra alike. From a regulatory perspective
– and keeping MiFID’s ultimate goal of
creating an EU-wide “level playing field”
in mind – comprehensive rules regarding HFT definitely would make sense.
Therefore, Deutsche Börse supports all
measures to enhance transparency, e.g.
the complete registration of all market
participants and a full recording of all
their trading activities – traditional trading and HFT alike. The Deutsche Börse
(2011) has come to the conclusion that
regulatory intervention in HFT must not
hurt the proven positive effect on market quality HFT has to offer. In particular, the variety of HFT strategies should
be preserved, as systemic risk should be
prevented. To achieve these goals, HFT
firms themselves may have to implement
security mechanisms – just as exchange
operators as Deutsche Börse already have.
Whichever regulatory rules may be implemented in the end, the regulators will
have to make sure that these rules apply
to every European market and to every
market participant in Europe to the very
same extent.
Rainer Riess
Michael Krogmann
Deutsche Börse AG

5 Paradigm Change Through
Algorithmic Trading
5.1 Introduction
Algorithmic trading nowadays often accounts for more than half of trade volume and order volume at large stock
exchanges. Its net effects are generally
found positive by researchers. Only few
voices from the scientific community –
more, however, from traders – point out
negative effects of algorithmic trading. A
notable difference lies between empirical

findings – that usually find positive effects – on the one hand, and some theoretical works and especially the sentiment
of traders, who often express their frustration about their computerized counterparts, on the other hand.
5.2 Availability of Data
Most scientific studies about algorithmic trading share one fundamental problem: data about algorithmic trading are
scarce. As one of the few stock exchanges, Deutsche Börse had for some
time quite reliable data on algorithmic trading. Their “Automated Trading
Program“ (ATP), which was in effect
from 2007 to early 2009, enabled them
to distinguish between algorithmic orders and human ones (Deutsche Börse
2009). Hendershott and Riordan (2011),
Gsell (2009), Groth (2009), and Maurer
and Schäfer (2011) analyze such datasets
which contain flags for orders placed
within the ATP environment. Their research questions differ, but they all more
or less conclude that the overall effect of
algorithmic trading is positive.
A fundamental critique of such analyses is that algorithms usually work well
in “normal” markets and then show the
often-found positive effects. The models
that algorithms base on are abstractions
of reality and must fail to reflect it in its
entirety. If a market situation is not part
of the possibility space of the model, several options are possible: The algorithm
halts trading and waits until the market is
“normal” again, thereby facing the risk to
generate possibly considerable losses. Another option is to continue trading using
the usual model, thus failing to trade optimally and possibly worsening the situation. Since the flash crash on May 6, 2010,
there have been repeated miniature flash
crashes that did not affect the whole market but only individual stocks. For both
phenomena, algorithms are blamed to be
the cause of the market irregularities.
However, an effective approach to regulation should base on well-established
results. A lot of work has to be done
here. Above all, the insufficient availability of appropriate data confines scientific progress. The deduction of the effect of algorithmic trading on the market from anonymous order book data can
only be very rudimentary. In our current
work, we attempt to find a way to analyze algorithmic trading activity whilst
only using anonymous order book data
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(Breuer and Burghof 2011). A mandatory flagging of algorithmic orders would
be desirable. Only then would it be possible to independently analyze algorithmic trading from many points of view
and estimate the effect on the market.
The restrictive handling of historic ATP
data by Deutsche Börse does not build
confidence but could increase the probability that the sentiment towards AT is
influenced by irrational fears.
5.3 Information Eﬃciency
Recent studies (Hendershott and Riordan
2011; Gsell 2009; Groth 2009; Maurer
and Schäfer 2011) analyze rather shortterm aspects of market microstructure in
an AT environment. Indeed, its existence
alters behavioral incentives of other market participants fundamentally and in the
long run. It is apparent that algorithms
process new information ever faster and
– assuming normal market conditions –
probably calculate its price impact better
than humans. It is still to be seen, however, how accurate trading algorithms
process information without slow human
traders monitoring them. Sometimes, the
superfast processing of news can be undesirable. An example for this is the news
about the bankruptcy of United Airways.
The airline’s stock price plummeted until it became clear that the news was already a couple months old. Because the
possibility to extract yields from new information has a very short and decreasing half-life, systems tend to react hastily
and without challenging the information.
Especially in delicate market situations,
rumors can develop a destructive power.
The effect that is likely to be most
important has however escaped scientific analysis so far. Capital markets are a
highly efficient instrument of capital allocation, especially because a large number of actors feed information into the
price via their trading activity. This information comes from various sources;
it may be obtained haphazardly or with
some effort. Algorithmic trading uncovers trade activity which is caused by that
information and uses this knowledge to
pocket a considerable part of the information yield. The better these algorithms
work, the less money the informed person will make out of this information. In
the long run, this could mean that the
costly generation of information turns
unprofitable, and in an extreme case even
the trade based on incidentally obtained
information does not pay anymore.
Business & Information Systems Engineering

In such a hypothetical market, ever less
information is traded ever more perfectly
and faster. The market draws nearer and
nearer the weak form of market efficiency
(Fama 1970) or eventually even the semistrong form of market efficiency. At the
same time, it moves away from the strong
form of market efficiency, because the incentive to feed information into the market becomes considerably less powerful.
It is this very effect that traders witness
when they trade against algorithms. They
know that information-based strategies
are detected rapidly and thwarted by appropriate front-running strategies (Biais
et al. 2010; Cvitanic and Kirilenko 2010).
Surly, there is still a need for theoretical
as well as empirical analysis here, because
due to these thoughts, the usefulness of
algorithmic trading is subject to scrutiny.
5.4 Regulation and Regulatory
Instruments
Regulatory considerations have to distinguish between the different types of algorithms. Limit orders which are bogus orders or part of quote-stuffing techniques
have to be considered under the light of
laws against market manipulation (e.g.,
§20a (1) No. 2 of the German Securities
Trading Act [WpHG]). Other strategies
improve the price quality by arbitraging
prices and equalizing them across different trading venues. Because of the market power of algorithms, there is the risk
that overly mechanic thinking and potent
algorithms may perturb the price formation process. Naturally it would be desirable to capture the positive effects of
algorithmic trading and to dampen the
potentially negative ones. There may be
more than one way to reach this aim.
A simple ban of algorithmic trading, as
sometimes demanded by certain political circles, cannot serve to reach this difficult aim. This would mean to also destroy many preferable effects of algorithmic trading. Of course, a distinction of
algorithmic and “normal” trading is not
easy. And certainly market participants
would program algorithms that operate
in the gray area to hide their true nature.
Currently, regulatory bodies are discussing possible means (Dombert 2011).
The often contemplated lower boundary
for limit order lifetimes is regarded sceptically. The comprehensible reason is that
an efficient risk management of orders
would be drastically complicated – especially, but not exclusively, in volatile
2|2012

markets. Dombert (2011) proposes an alternative that is worth discussing. With
an order-transaction-ratio, the number
of orders divided by the number of transactions would have to remain above some
exogenous constant.
In our view, a European regulatory
framework is desirable that defines the
playground for all market participants.
Within this framework, it should be left
to the trading venues how they wish to
treat algorithmic trading in the context
of their business model. Then it would
be up to them if they wanted to attract
algorithmic trading or to limit it in specific market conditions. Such a “menuapproach” leaves it in essence to the individual trader if he or she wishes to
face the competition from algorithms
with all their positive and negative effects or evade them by trading on trading
venues with appropriate restrictions that
apply always or under specific market
conditions.
5.5 Conclusion
As long as algorithms operate in the
dark, there is a profound uncertainty
about the effect of their activities. Therefore, algorithmic trading is partly in contradiction to fundamental principles of
stock exchanges: bringing buyers and
sellers together in a transparent manner.
On stock exchanges, trust is paramount.
The opacity of algorithmic trading –
as comprehensible it may be from the
point of view of their operators – undermines this principle. Currently, there
is no level playing field. However, it
is equally important to enable technical progress, which algorithmic trading
with its high-quality information processing definitely is. An improved availability of data and associated scientific
research can help to develop reasonable
regulatory frameworks for algorithmic
trading. With the increasing importance
of this way of trading in mind, there is
less and less reason to doubt that the implementation of appropriate regulatory
frameworks should have a high priority.
Arne Breuer
Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Burghof
University Hohenheim

6 High Frequency Trading –
A Central Bank View
The capital markets are currently at an
important juncture in their development.
99

BISE – DISCUSSION

Roughly half of all stock and foreign exchange trades conducted on the major
exchanges are no longer initiated by human traders; instead, they are the product of computer algorithms that are able
to analyze large volumes of data and initiate hundreds of orders in fractions of
a second. Humans are increasingly being
eliminated from the immediate decisionmaking process relating to the sale and
purchase of assets and being replaced by
software programs.
The speed with which orders are executed has become to be the most important factor and is now measured in milliand microseconds. New practices such as
“co-location” or “quote stuffing” – placing huge quantities of buy or sell orders
which the instigator intends to cancel almost immediately before they are executed – have become important instruments in the battle for the most rapid order execution. Fundamental data on the
value of the respective securities or currencies are of no, or only subordinate,
importance for HFT algorithms.
In HFT, positions are usually held for
between a number of milliseconds and
several hours. In today’s high-speed markets, the scales are no longer tipped in
favor of the investor who is best able to
assess the true value of an asset, but of
the investor able to trade fastest. True
investments are becoming increasingly
rare.
Since the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010
(a roughly 15-minute phase of unusual
and irrational volatility on the New York
Stock Exchange), HFT has been called
to the attention not only of the general
public but also of regulators and central
banks.
Numerous observers regard HFT as a
new technical means of executing existing trading strategy rather than a strategy in its own right. Advantages in terms
of speed have, they say, always been an
essential component of many successful
trading strategies. Seen from this perspective, HFT is not a completely new
phenomenon, but rather a technical evolution of the securities markets. HFT
should be regarded merely as an overarching term covering a multitude of different fields of use. Among the many tactics,
several of the most important are based
on providing liquidity in stock market
trading (market making). Others can be
included under the category “statistical
arbitrage” and use algorithms to swiftly
identify and exploit profitable trading
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opportunities based on price data. Others belong to a category known as liquidity detection, in which traders try to
seek out hidden large orders in order
books. Many critics term this “predatory trading”, and it is suspected of being
unfair and potentially damaging to the
market.
Against this complex background, any
assessment of HFT and all discussion
relating to potential regulation should,
where possible, be limited to the underlying HFT strategy. From a central
bank perspective, a sweeping judgment
on HFT is therefore neither appropriate, nor would it serve to improve the
regulatory framework for transparency,
stability and efficiency. That means that
both the advantages and disadvantages of
HFT need to be evaluated very specifically. Statements that HFT is in general
either good or bad for the market should
therefore be viewed with caution.
HFT players and exchange operators
are at pains to stress that overall HFT
perceptibly improves market liquidity
and the efficiency of price discovery
(McEachern Gibbs 2009). The majority
of investors benefit from reduced bid/ask
spreads – a common measure of liquidity, they say. This statement is backed
up by several scientific studies (Gomber
et al. 2011). However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that, especially
in very volatile market situations, HFT
could prove problematic and could additionally destabilize the market (Brogaard
2010). This must be investigated and, if
found to be true, regulators must step in
to limit the risks for the financial system.
The flash crash demonstrated that the
liquidity generated by HFT market makers, which usually keeps transaction costs
low, may suddenly evaporate in difficult
market phases (NANEX 2010). Unlike
regular “human” market makers, who are
obliged to remain in the market even in
times of extremely volatile prices, HFT
traders are generally not bound by such
constraints. In good times, HFT traders
therefore crowd out normal market makers and often even perform their role better, to the advantage of all market players.
In difficult markets, however, there is a
risk that trading flows could collapse with
all the attendant problems for the market as a whole, as HFT players withdraw.
To many market participants, the narrower bid/ask spreads and higher trading volume generated by HFT therefore
only represent “sham liquidity”. For this
reason there have been calls from various

quarters to oblige HFT market makers to
remain in the market even in times of
high volatility, similar to the obligations
imposed on normal market makers (EC
2010). In other words, they should start
to take some responsibility for the markets which they have, to date, merely used
to their advantage from their superior
position.
From a regulatory perspective, HFT
has proven problematic not only in these
rare but dramatic high volatility events,
but also in daily trading activities. While
bid/ask spreads have dropped significantly in recent years thanks to HFT
market makers, the average period for
which such players hold positions has
dropped sharply. According to a study on
the flash crash, most HFT market makers close out their positions after no more
than roughly 10 seconds (Kirilenko et
al. 2011). That means that the stabilizing effect in the event of heightened market volatility exerted by “normal” market
makers has given way to a “hot potato
effect”, where falling shares are merely
passed around at lightning speed.
As HFT has become more widespread,
the number of buy and sell orders has increased dramatically in recent years. The
tactic known as quote stuffing, which is
used by several HFT algorithms, is particularly problematic. For reasons of trading strategy, the HF trader places a large
number of orders per second, only to
cancel them again almost immediately
before execution. The very high cancellation rate this causes leads to a marked
divergence between apparent market liquidity and actual trading volume. An investor placing an order in response to
a bid or ask is therefore often unable
to carry out the transaction at the limit
shown. Although the explicit transaction
costs appear low, the implied costs may
be much higher. Apparent market liquidity and the size of bid/ask spreads
are therefore not by themselves reliable indicators of market liquidity and
efficiency.
An analysis of 1,172 trading days on
the New York Stock Exchange from 200701-01 to 2011-09-14 that was carried out
recently by the research firm NANEX
showed that there were just 35 billion real
transactions for 535 billion quotes. The
quotes-to-trades ratio needed to generate US$ 10,000 in real transaction volume moved from roughly 6–7 at the beginning of 2007 to 60–80 in mid-2011.
Higher figures indicate a less efficient
market: more information is required to
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achieve the same trading volume. Sudden and dramatic spikes in the number
of quotes are increasingly being observed
for individual US stocks, with individual HFT algorithms generating several
tens of thousands of quotes per second
for several seconds. Such bursts of activity are frequently accompanied by what
are known as “mini flash crashes”, where
securities lose 20%, 40% or even more
than 50% of their value in a space of seconds for no fundamental reason, only to
recover shortly afterwards. For instance,
according to the SEC, the United States
has witnessed more than 100 such inexplicable crashes since mid-2010 which
are suspected of being caused by HFT
algorithms.
Sending bids or asks is similar to sending spam email: both are virtually free for
the sender, but not for the recipient. Forwarding and processing such large volumes of data causes a lot of problems
and high costs for exchanges and market participants. Systems are often overloaded, which is seen by many observers
as one of the causes of the flash crash. To
make matters worse, certain HFT algorithms send some of these quotes only to
cause other traders or algorithms to act in
a certain way, which they can, in turn, exploit. As a consequence, an ever increasing number of institutional investors are
transferring their transactions away from
normal exchanges to “dark pools”, where
it is usually more difficult to make a profit
in HFT.
The above-described criticisms intend
to show that HFT is a controversial issue, requiring an exact analysis of the
details. In addition to “market friendly”
strategies that regulators regard as positive for the market – for instance, statistical arbitrage – there are also “unfriendly”
strategies that are seen as worrying. Others are basically welcome but when actually applied on the market entail problems and dangers which should be eliminated. HFT market making is just such
an example.
When considering the ultimate question of whether there is a correlation
between HFT and market efficiency, it
should be borne in mind that market efficiency mainly means that the price of
an asset adjusts to fundamental changes
in its value rapidly. It is not immediately
clear how HFT algorithms can contribute
to that, as decisions are based only on
the status of the order book in the last
few seconds or indicators based on technical analysis. A block trade of 10,000
Business & Information Systems Engineering

shares between two well-informed large
investors represents true price discovery
on the market. By contrast, shifting 100
shares back and forth between two HFT
algorithms in innumerous times makes
no equivalent contribution to trading efficiency, even if this takes place at impressive speed. A market that is mainly
dominated by HFT is also a market where
most orders have lost all connection to
fundamental factors. And this correlation
between price and fundamental value is
what should, in the main, determine the
quality of a market.
Dr. Joachim Nagel
Dr. Rafael Zajonz
Deutsche Bundesbank
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